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What Next
for the US and Saudi?
 Author:
Rob Wood
Posted: 17 May, 2003
Note: This piece was
written on 1 April, 2003, a month before the announcement that the
US was withdrawing forces from KSA.
It would almost be an
understatement to say that relations between the US and Saudi Arabia
(KSA) have been strained over the last few years. The fact that
many of the 911 suicide bombers hailed from KSA as well as the corresponding
perceived lack of action by the Saudi Government in curbing the
influence of extremists within the gulf state after 911 has been
a major bone of contention between these powers. Recent developments,
however, might indicate that the US is willing to tolerate recalcitrant
rhetoric in return for securing practical Saudi cooperation, at
least for the time being. KSA is pursuing a public face of strident
opposition to the attack on Iraq at the same time lending active
practical support to the US in that attack. But will the changed
strategic environment after the attack on Iraq change things between
these powers?
The rhetoric coming from
Riyadh might lead many to suggest the strident opposition of the
KSA government to the war. The comparative silence by Washington
on issues of Saudi cooperation for the attack on Iraq would do little
to dispel this view. Riyadh speaks of "brother Saddam"
and publicly condemns the war. Crown Prince Abdullah publicly proclaims
that,. "The kingdom will not in any way participate in the
war on Iraq. Its forces will not in any way enter one inch of Iraqi
territory." There have been many offers of Saudi involvement
in brokering peace deals between Iraq and the US in an effort to
stave off the action, as well as public professions of discomfort
with the US position on this issue.
The press of both the
Middle East and the West, with only a few exceptions, has chosen
to focus on the rhetorical opposition of KSA to the US attack on
Iraq. Some reporters have even mistakenly named KSA as being absent
from the list of US allies - a symptom of the lax press coverage
of their real cooperation and the focus on their rhetorical damnation
of the military action. The fact that Donald Rumsfeld's revelation
that some members of the "Coalition of the Willing" did
not wish to be publicly named was most likely a result of Saudi
requests, was overlooked by most media.
The extent to which KSA
is willing to go to cover up its cooperation with the US is also
an interesting factor in this relationship between the US and KSA.
An element of the sensitivity of Riyadh to public disclosure of
its close ties with Washington was seen during the last Arab Summit.
Colonel Gadhafi of Libya launched a verbal assault against KSA,
warning of the dangers of allowing US troops to be stationed there.
He was met by the angry interdiction of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah
who publicly called him a liar. It was heated exchange which made
news around the world. Unfortunately for the Prince, this episode
simply highlighted to many the fact of Saudi cooperation with the
US in allowing the current troop buildup. The Prince's retorts were
effectively hot air.
The cold hard cooperation
of the KSA government with the US is quite far reaching. The US
commander of the air war is actually being hosted by the KSA government
and the bombing campaign is being directed from that country without
the wide knowledge of the Saudi public. The airfields at Tabuk and
Arar were closed months ago to civilian traffic and have been devoted
exclusively to American military operations. Prince Sultan Airport
is also being used by the Americans in their push to Baghdad with
up to 5000 troops being based there (it was previously used as the
US air command centre for operations to Afghanistan). Total US troop
deployment within KSA has reached as high as 11000 without even
taking into account the reports of UK troops deployments to the
Kingdom.
Saudi cooperation with
the US attack on Iraq again came to the fore at the time of Turkey's
decision not to allow the US to use Turkey as a staging ground for
the attack. Reports came as late as March 15 that the US was redeploying
some of its naval assets from the Mediterranean so that any missile
attacks from the ships would not cross Turkish soil (even though
some missile have in fact crashed in Turkey). Those ships were to
be redeployed to the Red Sea where they would have the ability to
strike at Iraq with Saudi cooperation via the use of Tomahawk Missiles.
Once again the permission of KSA to conduct such attacks across
Saudi territory is indicative of the practical cooperation they
are lending the US campaign. Effectively, the Saudis are pursuing
a policy of conciliation to anti-US domestic elements whilst at
the same time conciliating the US with practical cooperation kept
under wraps - a duplicitous policy carried on for some time now.
So what does this mean
for the future Saudi-US relationship? It would seem that the US
came to the realisation a while ago that the Saudi government is
willing to lend the US practical support on the condition that the
US doesn't make the domestic situation for the Saudis uncomfortable.
The current practical realities of waging war on Iraq means that
the US has accepted the double-dealing role of the Saudis without
much complaint. The real test for the relationship between KSA and
the US will come with the conclusion of the war on Iraq when the
US no longer strictly needs its military based in KSA due to its
position in Iraq. At that point we are likely to see the true sentiment
of America towards the Saudi penchant for publicly criticising US
actions. At such a time it would seem unlikely that the relationship
will benefit from the existing Saudi attitude.
Author: Rob Wood
Email: news@polosbastards.com
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