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Liberia:
A Backgrounder
 Author:
S. Kpanbayeazee Duworko, II
Posted: 24 June, 2003
PREFACE
For nearly twenty-five
years, Liberia has hit major news headlines worldwide not for famous
actions, but for infamous actions. These actions have not just dampened
the country’s image; they have also caused the country to disintegrate
rapidly, especially in the last ten years.
For almost five years
now, I have been actively involved in peacebuilding work. I have
come to realize that much needs to be done if we are to move this
country from the cycle of violence to a stable society.
What is of concern is
that in spite of the more that twenty peacebuilding or related institutions
in Liberia, war continues. The war has been so devastating that
people have not been able to rebuild their lives. There are two
questions that people are asking. These are (1) “ What impact
are all these organizations making in this country?” and (2)
What are the roles of these institutions in this country?”
These questions are fundamental
and they deserve sincere answers from all of us, especially Liberians
who are involved in peacebuilding efforts throughout the country.
Although foreign nationals are concerned about our country, we must
be the torchbearers of peace.
This work, Studies
in Liberianology - Volume I: Re-Assessing Peacebuilding Strategies
in Liberia, is an attempt to help us find workable solutions
to the many problems affecting this glorious land of liberty. The
term Liberianology comes from the country’s name, Liberia.
It is hoped that this and subsequent issues will critically look
at our checkered history, analyzing and suggesting means to improve
our country; thereby, contributing to the stability of the Mano
River basin.
My thanks to SKW,
Jr. who introduced me to the formal/academic aspects of peacebuilding
by affording me the opportunity to attend a workshop in peacebuilding
and human rights education in 1997 in Monrovia; and Dr. Ben A. Roberts,
president of the University of Liberia, for his encouragement and
interest in research. My thanks to the management of the Liberians
United to Serve Humanity (LUSH) for giving me the experience to
serve as coordinator forits Counselling, Trauma Healing, Reconciliation
and Peacebuilding Department. This experience has enriched my understanding
of peacebuilding. My thanks to Thomas G. Du, my long time colleague,
friend and brother who read this manuscript and made valuable suggestions.
Finally, I also like to thank Rev. Bartholomew C. Colley, another
long time friend, brother and colleague whose pieces of advice have
helped me along the way as a peacebuilder. All errors are my responsibility.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
At a workshop in Sinoe County in southeastern Liberia in 2001, a
colleague of mine and staff were forced to restructure their training
program they had carried to the people. They had gone there with
their mind fixed and a planned training package. They had arrived
in the county as experts. Little did they ever think
that they would have to go back literally to the drawing board to
reassess their methods of training in peacebuilding.
It was a moving experience
for my colleagues when for two days they were confronted with new
realities. First, they had to come to grips with the fact that the
war has brought out culture sensitivity in people. Second, they
also had to confront the reality that the war has made people identity
conscious. Third, they also realized that the war has made people
change roles - the rich have become poor or vice versa.
The experience being
narrated here occurred with some members of the Sapo ethnic group.
Before the coup of 1980, little was known of this group. Many members
of the group had served as domestic servants of the Kru and Americo-Liberian/settler
groups in Sinoe County. Since linguistically they are closer to
both the Kru and Krahn ethnic groups, many Sapos became acculturated
as Krus or Krahns. The Sapos were never counted as an ethnic group
before the military putsch.
But in 1980, the year
of the military takeover, the tide began to change for the Sapos.
They started to see themselves as equals with the two groups in
Sinoe
and with any other group in the country. The reason was that Maj.
Gen. Thomas Wes Syen, Jr,. the number two man in the junta and Oscar
Quiah, the junta’s first minister of internal affairs were
Sapos and they did not hide their identity. Quiah went on to become
a member of the first council of state that ruled the country for
a brief period during the civil war.
The Sapo ethnic group
is not the only group to have gone through such an ordeal. The Gbi
is one group that has suffered similar fate as the Sapo. Sandwiched
between the Gios and Bassa, the Gbis were acculturated either as
Gios or Bassas. It was in the 1980s that they began to see themselves
as an integral
identifiable group in the Liberian political microscope.
Or take the case of the
Mandingo ethnic group. The Mandingoes arrived in Liberia before
the Americo-Liberians. But the Mandingoes were largely relegated
in the political spectrum of the country in spite of their huge
economic power. Like the Sapos, they began to push for mainstream
politics after 1980. Hence the Mandingoes saw the late President
Samuel Doe not just as an ally, but also as their only hope to maintain
and gain political status. Unfounded reports indicate that the late
President Doe was contemplating making a Mandingo a vice presidential
running mate if elections were held in 1990. Perhaps that is why
in their quest for identity and political mainstreaming, many of
our Mandingo and Krahn brethren have taken to the bush and are today
combating the national government led by President Charles Taylor.
Added to the continual fighting in the northwest of the country
are the continual violent student demonstrations throughout the
country. The two cases talked about earlier and the Sinoe workshop
experience raise serious concerns about the peacebuilding initiatives
that we as peacebuilders are undertaking in this country.
There are more than twenty
(20) listed international and national nongovernmental organizations
engaged in peace related work throughout the country. Many of these
organizations have been in Liberia for more then ten (10) years.
What impact have they made on the peace process in this country,
this sweet land of
liberty that is ours?
What are wrong with our
strategies that mean Liberia continues to be in flame? Are we too
academic in our approach? Are we going to our people as experts
with all the answers instead of as co-workers? Are our training
packages planned only by us and not with the people? Or is the continual
war the problem of governance by the governors? If so, why have
we, as peacebuilders, not ensured that good governance takes place?
Or is it because we have failed to put in place early warning indicators
or “actions to prevent disputes from arising between parties,
to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to
limit the spread of the latter whey they occur?” (Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
An Agenda for Peace, New York, 1995, 2nd ed., p. 13.)
Surely, there is a need
for peacebuilders in Liberia to rethink their strategies because
people are not only dying in Liberia and are continuously being
displaced in the Mano River basin, but they are also “traumatized
and re-traumatized…” and have over the years, no doubt,
realized “their forced dehumanization as the most severe trauma
inflicted on them (Joyce Braak, “Dehumanization Trauma in Afghanistan:
The Taliban’s War on Women,” in Trauma Lines, Issue IV,
20012, p.10).
CHAPTERTWO
A BRIEF HISTORY OF
CRISIS POINTS IN LIBERIA - A BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE COUNTRY’S
CONFLICT
Situated on the Gulf
of Guinea in West Africa, the country was founded 1847 as a home
for repatriated slaves from America and those captured on slave
ships in the Congo basin in central Africa. Liberia has a land area
of 37, 743 square miles.
The country is divided
into fifteen political subdivisions called counties. These are Montserrado,
Grand Bassa, Sinoe, Lofa, Nimba, Rivercess, Margibi, Grand Cape
Mount, Bong, Grand Gedeh, Gbapolu, River Gee, Maryland Bomi and
Grand Kru.
Unofficially, there are
eighteen ethnic groups that inhabit and co-exist in the country.
These are the settler (Americo Liberians and Congoes) Klao (Kru),
Mah (Mano), Dan (Gio), Lorma, Belleh, Gbandi, Kissi, Sapo, Bassa,
Kpelle, Vai, Krahn, Mandingo, Gbi, Dei, Gola and Mende.
The constitution of Liberia
is modelled after that of the United States of America. There are
three branches of government - legislative, executive, and judiciary.
These should be independent of each other. But the history of Liberia
shows that a cult of the presidency has existed for over half a
century such that the presidency is regarded as lord and gospel
in society.
The settlers ruled the
country during the first republic (1847-1980). The settler rule
was implemented basically through the Americo-Liberians, who themselves
were first divided on the basis of US southern plantation mentality
-house Negroes and field Negroes. The house Negroes and their mulatto
masters settled in Monrovia and its immediate nearby surroundings
while the field Negroes were sent to settlements such as Clay Ashland,
Louisiana, Philadelphia (in Maryland County) and Lexington and Mississippi
(in Sinoe County).
The second divide in
the settler group was on color line/skin pigmentation. The divide
on color line/skin pigmentation is seen in the 1871 issue that led
to the ousting and assassination of President Edward James Roye,
the first dark skinned president of the nation. The mulattos led
by Joseph Jenkins Roberts, the country’s first president, assassinated
him because he was dark skinned. However, President Roye’s
True Whig Party (TWP) again won the elections later in 1871. This
victory, according to Quentin Outram, meant “Intra-settler
conflicts were resolved…” (The Lessons of Liberia: An
Analysis of the Liberian Complex Political Emergency 1989-1997,
London: University of Leeds, 1998, p. 14).
Just as the settlers
were made to look down on their African identity when they were
slaves, they had no regards for the identity of their brothers and
sisters whom they met on these shores. They shunned nearly everything
that was African or traditional. Before the 1970s many indigenes
were forced to adopt Americo-Liberian names by living with Americo-Liberians.
This afforded them the opportunity to get education and eventually
employment and acceptance into fraternities such as the Masonic
craft. That was how many indigenes became Dennises, Yancies, Barclays,
Kings, Joneses or Brisbanes. My father used to be called Samuel
Brisbane before he graduated from the Booker Washington Institute
in 1956.
Other indigenes that
did not have the opportunity to stay with Americo-Liberians anglicized
their names in order to make headways in education, employment and
fraternities. That was how Wotor, Yekeh, Kollie,Molly and Kpadeh
became Wotorson, Yekehson, Kollison, Morris and Kpadehson respectively.
If you did not adopt
an Americo-Liberian name or anglicize your name, then you had to
find another route for acculturation - marriage. Hence, that is
how people like Henry Boima Fahnbulleh who was married into the
Americo-Liberian ruling class rose to such high positions as Ambassador
to East Africa.
The Americo-Liberian
ruling class celebrated two holidays yearly. These were January
7 and December 1. These days were set aside as Pioneers Day and
Matilda Newport Day respectively. Pioneers Day was meant to honor
the settlers for coming to this country and bringing light to an
uncivilized people while Matilda Newport Day was meant to honor
the heroic ideal of Matilda Newport for her gallantry in shooting
and killing natives/indigenes who allegedly attacked the settlers
at the battle of Fort Hill.
Another serious crisis
point in Liberia’s chequered history was the Fernando Po crisis.
In the late 1920s, the government of President Charles D.B. King
was accused of trafficking in human beings - transporting indigenes,
principally from the southeast to work on the Spanish island of
Fernando Po in Equatorial Guinea. The League of Nations described
the situation as being “hardly distinguishable from organized
slave trade, and that in the enforcement of this system the services
of the Liberian Frontier Force and the services and influence of
certain high government officials are constantly and systematically
used” (The League of Nations’ Report of the International
Commission of Enquiry into the Existence of Slavery and Forced Labor
in the Republic of Liberia, The Hague: League of Nations, 1930 p.5;
for further information, read I. K. Sundiata’s Black Scandal:
The Liberian Labor Crisis of 1928 - 1936, Pennsylvania: Institute
for the Study of Human Issues, 1980.)
The exposure of the Fernando
Po crisis led the national government under President Edwin J. Barclay
to take reprisal action against the Krus in 1930. The Krus and Grebos
who were opposed to the depopulation of their towns as a result
of the trade in human cargoes had testified en mass before
the Commission of Enquiry that indeed their kinsmen were forcibly
taken to Fernando Po. Although the national legislature, did institute
laws stopping the export of labour and the pawning system, the national
government fought bitterly to punish the Krus and the Grebos by
burning many of their towns and cities, including Barclayville.
According to Sundiata, “the public relations value of such
actions was largely relegated by the news that the Monrovia government
was forcibly attacking the Kru and Grebo for testifying before the
League’s Commission of inquiry” (p. 128). The irony is
that President Barclay who was Secretary of State
(minister of foreign affairs) at the time of the crisis was one
of the principal lawyers of the Syndicole Agricola, the Spanish
agriculture company on Fernando Po for whom the forcibly recruited
Liberians worked.
Tribalism has been another
high crisis point in Liberia. The regimes of President Tubman and
Samuel Kanyon Doe helped fuel tribal sentiments throughout the country.
Although Tubman ended the idea of provinces and came out with his
Unification Policy, the country was highly divided on tribal lines.
Nearly 98 % of students who went to private school or were sent
abroad for academic training were children of the Americo-Liberians.
The bulk of the indigenes could not afford to send their children
to private schools, which offered quality education at the time.
Nearly all the ministerial and directorial posts were held by Americo-Liberians.
(Read Gus J. Liebenow’s Liberia: The Evolution of the Priviledge,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1969).
Tubman crowned it up
in 1968 when he accused an indigene, Ambassador Fahnbulleh, of attempting
to stage a communist supported coup. Ambassador Fahnbulleh was said
to be the prime suspect and well-established indigenes like the
acculturated Burlieh Kennedy, the first superintendent of Lofa County,
were accused as accomplices. All the top Americo-Liberian lawyers
in the country refused to defend Fahnbulleh. He represented himself
in court, was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.
After Tubman’s death
in a London clinic in 1971, his successor was Vice President William
Richard Tolbert, Jr. President Tolbert tried to unify the country
when he nominated the late Jackson Fiah Doe to succeed him as vice
president for the nation. But the hard-core conservatives of the
ruling TWP refused to accept Jackson’s nomination. Instead,
they chose another Americo-Liberian, James E. Greene. This angered
the indigenes, who felt that they were being marginalized and used
as canon folders by the Americo-Liberian ruling class.
Tolbert was killed in
a bloody coup the morning of April 12, 1980 in circumstances that
are still doubtful. The coup leader, then Mst. Sgt. Samuel K.
Doe, used the Americo-Liberian versus countryman/indigene issue
to win support for his coup. He and his fellow coupists accused
the Tolbert regime of tribalism, and widespread corruption. But
no sooner than six months in office, it was crystal clear that Mst.
Sgt. Samuel Doe and his People’s Redemption Council would be
extremely corrupt and tribalistic.
A major crisis point
during the Doe regime was the events leading to and the rigging
of the general elections in 1985. Nearly six weeks to the date of
the elections, only Mst. Sgt. Samuel Doe’s National Democratic
Party of Liberia (NDPL) had been allowed to register as a full-fledged
political party. Barely
three weeks to elections, the Liberia Action Party(LAP), the Liberia
Unification Party (LUP) and the Unity Party (UP) were allowed to
register after much pressure from the United States government.
In the words of Amos Sawyer, “Presumably upon the prodding
of the Americans, Doe agreed to let other parties
register a few weeks before the elections…” (Effective
Immediately: Dictatorship in Liberia, 1980 - 1986: A Personal Perspective,
Rijksweg: Africa Center, 1988,
p.29).
Doe accentuated tribalism
after the failed 1985 attempts by the late Brig. Gen. Thomas Qwiwonkpa
to topple the government, one month seven days after the
rigged general elections. The Gio and Mano ethnic groups suffered
gravely. Many of their communities in Montserrado, Grand Gedeh and
Nimba Counties were
raided and men and women killed. “It all would have seemed
a dream were it not for the massacre that ensued after Doe regained
control…. As television cameras followed the dancing crowds
around the city, record was being made for the greatest vendetta
ever known in Liberia…. Gio communities in Monrovia, Nimba
and Grand Gedeh were raided and looted; large numbers of residents
were killed” (Sawyer, p.32).
Many Manos and Gios were
also forced to flee the country, particularly for Cote d’Ivoire,
where they joined many Americo-Liberians who also fled President
Doe’s repression. And in Cote d’Ivoire, the quest to remove
President Doe from power through force began to take roots. Propertied
Americo-Liberians, Gios and Manos who were disenchanted with the
Doe regime bundled themselves in the National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (NPFL) to unseat President Doe. With the backing of the
triangular force - the governments of Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina
Faso and Libya - the NPFL began its war December 24, 1989.
The war which began as
a popular uprising , soon took a tribal turn, particularly among
Gio, Mano, Krahn and Mandingo. The Gio and Mano constituted one
group while the Krahn and Mandingo formed the other group. As the
murder and mayhem took a wider dimension, the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) organized an intervention force
called ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). But ECOWAS itself was divided
on policy issues about Liberia. Francophone ECOWAS gave its support
to Mr. Charles Taylor and his shadow NPFL government based in Gbarnga
while Anglophone ECOWAS supported Mr. Amos Sawyer and his generally
internationally accepted Interim Government of National Unity based
in Monrovia. Outram notes, “Failures in ECOWAS policy were
made obvious by the outbreak of the ‘second war’ in 1992.
The prime preventable failure of the ECOWAS intervention and the
wider international community was the excessive time taken to bring
a negotiated end to the war, itself the result of internal divisions
within ECOWAS” (pp. 3 - 4).
The war had a devastating
effect on the country. It destroyed the social fabric of the society,
breaking down morals. Many armed groups (warring factions) and warlords
emerged; thus, giving rise to the high rate of armed robbery in
the country, particularly Monrovia, the capital city. (See Appendix
for listing of Warring Factions.)
CHAPTER THREE
THE WAY FORWARD - SOME USEFUL HINTS
A chronology of events
in Liberia as indicated below shows that the nation has gone through
nearly twenty-five years of violence.
1979 : The Rice Riots
- University of Liberian student Irene Nimpson killed
and millions of dollars worth of property damaged.
1980 : The People’s
Redemption Council (PRC) staged a military coup - President William
R. Tolbert, Jr., and thirteen others killed.
1981 : PRC Vice Chairman
and six other PRC members executed for alleged coup plot.
1982 : The Nimba Raid - Some five persons died, including Brig.
Gen. Robert
Saye.
1985 : Attempted Coup
- Coup leader Brig. Gen. Thomas Qwiwonkpa and
nearly 1,000 persons killed.
1988 : Attempted Coup
- Coup leader Brig. Gen. J. Nicholas Podier and nearly
twenty others killed.
1989 - 1997 : Phase I of the Civil War - Launched on Christmas eve
by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, nearly 600,000 persons
died.
1999 - Present : Phase II of the Civil War- Launched by the Liberians
United for Reconciliation and Democracy, the war has displaced nearly
400,000 persons and killed some 50,000 so far.
How do we as peace builders
break or help break the circle of violence? How can we, as “salt
of the Liberia”, help to preserve the country from disintegrating
further?
A. Taking a Critical
Look at Self
Many times in our country,
workers and institutions involved in peacebuilding are often critical
of government officials and government actions which contradict
the national constitution and international conventions that Liberia
is signatory to. Sometimes, the government responds, “That
those people who are talking can not teach us democracy because
they themselves are not democratic.”
While it may be agreed
that the government is simply trying to lash back at these institutions,
it is also true that many peacebuilding institutions are not democratic
and are simply one man or family run organizations. In other cases,
many of these institutions are simply “black bag” institutions,
that is they are run simply in bags, they have no offices.
Another serious problem
with many peacebuilding institutions is that they do not possess
the trained manpower. In some cases, officials of these institutions
refused to employ people with the requisite skills for fear that
the people to be employed will overshadow them and will eventually
win the favor of foreign partners, if any.
What is happening in
Liberia is that many people involved in peacebuilding or related
activities such as human rights/democracy advocacy do not have the
requisite professional training. This phenomenon is prevalent in
the circles of human rights organizations.
B. Building a Strong
Coalition
For peacebuilding and
related organizations to make a forceful stance on issues, there
is a need for these organizations to form a coalition. A coalition
will speak with one voice. Every organization will not be speaking
loosely on issues in a coalition. Every organization will be assigned
a particular role. A coalition does not mean that organizations
will lose their individual identities.
The Inter Religious Council
(formerly Interfaith Council), which comprises members of the Liberia
Council Churches and National Muslim Council, has been doing well
to help bring peace to Liberia. Nevertheless, its efforts to bring
other groups such as the Ba’hai on board have met with a lukewarm
reception or none at all.
Moreover, the Christian
groups themselves are divided on what their interpretation is concerning
the Christian role in the fight for social justice in a society.
Although the mainstream churches have been collectively vocal on
societal ills through the Liberian Council of Churches, they have
individually occasionally been critical of the ills of the society.
The most vocal is the Catholic Church which sees part of its obligation
as being a conscience of society. Through their pastoral letters,
the Catholic bishops have continued to push for a more just and
stable Liberia where people will be judged by their actions and
not by their tribe and status.
For their part, the Pentecostal
churches have largely remained mute about the ills of society and
many have refused to join the Liberia Council of Churches. The Pentecostals
usually base their silence about the ills of society on their interpretation
of Romans 13:1-7.
And through an effective
and well coordinated coalition, the Christian community has the
potential of going beyond a mere crusade as was done in February
2002 under the auspices of the Liberia for Jesus organization. We
need to learn from the experiences of other religious communities.
For instance, in Cambodia,
since the country is predominantly Buddhist, the Cambodian Ghandi
(Maha Ghosananda) perceived the idea of establishing a month-long
peace walk know as Dhammayietra. “In Buddhist terminology,
the Dhammayietra treads the ‘Middle Path.’ Dhammayietra
is making a statement for peace and non-violence, and against policies,
strategies and actions that lead to violence…” (European
Centre for Conflict Prevention, People Building Peace : 35 Inspiring
Stories from Around the World, The Netherlands: European Centre
for Conflict Prevention, pp. 220-221).
The Christian community
needs to reflect on Jesus’ teachings on peace when he says,
“Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called sons
of God” (Matt. 2:9). For if Christians are to be peacemakers,
they need to get deeply involved in activities that will lead to
lasting peace.
The civil society as
a natural movement is very fragile and largely fragmented. The efforts
made by the Trauma Healing, Reconciliation and Peacebuilding Department
of the Lutheran Church in Liberia-Lutheran World Service/Federation
in May and July 2002 need to be augmented. The civil society organizations
in Liberia need to learn from the experiences of their counterparts
in neighbouring Sierra Leone. A strong and united civil society
entails several measures.
First, the civil society
needs a leadership that is not centered on “I”. It must
be centered on “we” as a team. A leadership focused on
“I” will always be concerned about the personal material
growth of themselves in leadership and not the group.
The second factor that
the civil society needs to consider is the creation of a national
program that is home (Liberia) focused, not foreign trip centered.
What is happening is that many of the leaders of Liberian civil
society organizations are concerned more with being heard abroad
than at home. The civil society organizations should work towards
a national program to be carried out by all of them.
C. Overhauling the National
Reconciliation and Reunification Commission
Since its composition
in 1997, the NRRC is yet to make the impact that it should be making.
It is an organization that many persons cannot tell you about. Many
people will ask you, “What is it about?” Apart from the
statements that are issued calling for people to stop fighting (as
was done in September 1998) and
on activities that the NRRC carried out sometime ago in Grand Cape
Mount County, the NRRC remains an entity in name.
If the NRRC were working
substantively, it would have helped to reduce tension in the country
by drawing out relevant programs promoting peace and unity in the
land. It would view reconciliation as a process and not an event.
D. Reviewing the Training
Process
Since 1991, trainings
in peacebuilding and related activities have taken place in every
nook and corner of the country. Both civilians and securities have
attended these training sessions organized by both local and international
NGOs. Yet, Liberia remains at war.
Surely, there is a need
to critically reflect about the trainings that we carry out throughout
this country. An assessment of the training process in peacebuilding
and related activities will reveal three major weaknesses.
The first major weakness
with the peacebuilding training process in Liberia is that training
needs are imposed or assumed. Training needs analyses (TNAs) are
rarely done to determine the training needs of the participants.
Most often, training needs are set in our offices and taken to the
sites.
The next weakness confronting
the training process is that it is too foreign textbook or foreign
academic oriented. We hardly rely on the practical experiences of
the participants. Many of our examples are taken from western textbooks.
Many of us involved in peacebuilding work are either lazy writers
or we do not have the writing skills to jot down our own or other
people’s experiences gained from the field in Liberia.
This lack of creative
impulse has made much training, to borrow the words of Sam G. Doe,
have the “same method, same symbols, same author… What
struck us in this process was the consistent use of just a few materials
for training across the world. Take any training material in peacebuilding
and you will come across a conflict tree, onion, egg, etc. There
will be a pyramid of top, middle and bottom sectors; there will
be a triangle depicting attitude, situation, and
behavior. The definitions of conflict, peace, justice, etc will
essentially be the same and the authors cited will mainly come from
North America, especially the United States of America” (“Peacebuilding
and Conflict Intervention: A Critical Review of Training” in
From the Field, Issue Number 3, 2001, p.4).
The third major weakness
is the use of the same old facilitators/trainers at the various
workshops or seminars throughout the country. After more than five
years of training people in Liberia, having new facilitators emerged?
Trainings become dull when people continue to see the same old faces
treating the
same old topics over and over. And what is pathetic is that these
same old facilitators use the same old notes.
Training changes lives.
Therefore, if training is to have the desired impact then we need
to re-examine our training strategies. This will enable us to correct
the flaws in our strategies.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
ON LIBERIA
(This will enable interested persons to an in depth understanding
of the Liberian conflict.)
Akpan, M. D. (1973) “Black
Imperialism: Americo-Liberian Rule Over the African Peoples of Liberia:
1841-1964”, Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 7.
No 2 pp. 217-236.
Berg, Elliot (1982) The
Liberian Crisis and an Appropriate US Response: Report to USAID,
Washington, DC. USAID.
Chaudhuri, J. Pal (1985)
“An Analysis of the Recent Developments in Liberia”,
Liberia Forum, Vol. 1 No. 1 pp. 45-54.
Clower, Robert et al.
(1966) Growth Without Development: An Economy Survey of Liberia,
Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press.
Davis, Ronald (1975)
“The Struggle for Authority on the Kru Coast”, International
Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 8 No. 2 pp. 222-265.
Fraenkel, Merran (1964)
Tribe and Class in Monrovia, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hayden, Thomas (1985)
Report on Liberia: Human Rights Issues, Washington, D.C.:
Society of African Missions, Social Concerns Department (Mimeographed).
International Human Rights
Law Group (1986) Human Rights in Liberia: An Update, Washington,
D.C.: IHRLG.
Jones, Hannah Abeodu
(1962) “The Struggle for Political and Cultural Unification
of Liberia: 1847 - 1930”, Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern
University, Evaston, Illionois.
Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights (1986) Liberia: A Promise Betrayed, New York:
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.
League of Nations (1930)
Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into the Existence
of Slavery and Forced Labor in the Republic of Liberia, The
Hague: League of Nations.
Liberia Research and
Information Project (1985) “ Doe and the Death of Due Process”,
Liberia Alert Vol, 1. No. 1.
Liebenow, J. Gus (1969)
Liberia: The Evolution of the Privilege, Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press.
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APPENDIX
AFL Armed Forces of Liberia
(the national army)
BB Black Beret
CDF Congo Defence Force
INPFL Independent National
Patriotic Front of Liberia
LDF Lofa Defence Force
LPC Liberia Peace Council
LURD Liberians United
for Reconciliation and Democracy
NPFL National Patriotic
Front of Liberia
NPFL/CRC National Patriotic
Front of Liberia/Central Revolution Council
ULIMO/J United Liberation
Movement for Democracy in Liberia/Roosevelt
Johnson- leader
ULIMO/K United Liberation
Movement for Democracy in Liberia/Alhaji Kromahleader
Author: S. Kpanbayeazee
Duworko, II
Department of English and Literature
Liberia College
University of Liberia
Monrovia, Liberia
West Africa
Contact: duworko2@yahoo.com
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