| Saddam's
Iraq: Will it be invaded?
 Author:
Rob Wood
Posted: July 3, 2002
When George Bush Jr. made his first intimations that the US may
again invade Iraq, this time to remove Saddam Hussein from power,
the world raised a collective eyebrow. This certainly wasn't a new
idea (Clinton had previously intimated that if Iraq complied with
every requirement then the US may still not lift sanctions), but
many thought he was getting a little carried away with the war on
terror. What then has changed in the Middle East political scene
that would attract renewed ire from a line of US presidents? There
are several possible strategic reasons that the US may want to take
another look at in the region.
The secret of Saddam's
ambitions with regards to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) was
possibly the worst kept secret since Liberace's "outing".
At the end of the Gulf War it was amply clear that Saddam had a
far greater biological and chemical weapons program than was originally
thought. Scarier still was the fact that he had proven his willingness
to employ such weapons in the Iran conflict of the preceding decade.
The continued frustration of the United Nations Weapons inspectors
(UNSCOM) in being allowed to properly assess the scope of the program
showed to the world that Saddam was not serious about complying
with his obligations after the Gulf War ended. UNSCOM was evicted
from Iraq in 1998.
Since the eviction of
UNSCOM, there have been several Iraqi defectors more than willing
to tell tales of Saddam's renewed vigour in constructing WMDs. The
problem in trusting such sources is their reliance on their stories
to ensure their welcome as refugees to the West.
Nevertheless, whilst
there is no sure way of knowing the exact capacity of Saddam's chemical
and biological arsenal, the likelihood that it has been amply increased
is almost a certainty if the pre-1998 findings of UNSCOM are anything
to go by. UNSCOM chairman, Richard Butler, at the time of eviction
in 1998, was unwilling to give a declaration that Iraq's capacity
or willingness to produce WMDs had been negated, citing the unwillingness
of the Iraqis to provide evidence of such. (The onus of proof was
placed firmly on Iraq by the agreed-upon cease-fire terms in 1991.)
Combined with unexplained instances of weaponised biological agents
found in Iraq during UNSCOM's stay, it would be a stretch to argue
that Iraq had ceased its pursuits in this area since 1998.
The recalcitrance of
Hussein's regime also means that Iraq is in violation of at least
eight Security Council resolutions according to Butler. International
law also allows resolutions of the UN Security Council to be enforced.
Allowing Saddam to continue to thumb his nose at the Security Council
can only have detrimental repercussions for the legitimacy of that
world body if they are allowed to continue in the medium- to long-term.
This thought alone may sway the Security Council towards passing
the required Enabling Resolution to legitimise any potential US
invasion of Iraq. We can also be assured of continued US lobbying
for this to happen.
Perhaps most worrying
to the US is the growing popularity of Saddam with other countries
of the Middle East. Last month's exchange of POWs from the Iran-Iraq
war of the 80s was enough to bring a tear to the eye of all but
the most cynical humanitarians. George Bush's Axis of Evil speech,
citing both Iraq and Iran as offenders, probably also served to
drive these two former enemies closer together. The last Arab summit
also saw Iraq make overtones of reconciliation towards both Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia, which was welcomed by the rest of the participants.
Whilst Iraq will probably
not quite be receiving Christmas cards from either Saudi Arabia
or Kuwait this year (for more than the obvious reason!) the path
to reconciliation has certainly begun. Bush Jr. may indeed be losing
some sleep over the possibility of an Arab world united in purpose,
with Saddam pulling some of the strings. The thought of Saddam being
able to turn off the Middle East oil taps (or at least have increased
influence in this process) may also upset some of Bush's buddies
in certain companies that shall remain nameless. Yes, the dreaded
cliché of oil again creeps into the equation.
Two other aspects of
Middle East politics that will need immediate attention by the US
if Bush is to attack Iraq are the Israeli-Palestinian situation
and the threat of social unrest in Saudi Arabia. The worsening situation
of the Palestinians will have a great effect on the level of Middle
Eastern support that the US can expect in the event of an attack
on Iraq. So too the situation in Saudi Arabia, which will surely
worsen in the event of a US attack. Such could put a severe strain
on the ability of the current Saudi administration to retain power.
 Many
armchair psychoanalysts may also want to take a crack at Saddam's
Hammurabi complex. Rather than digging up the archaeological sites
of the great kingdom of Babylon, Saddam is ordering their reconstruction,
complete with brick carrying his own inscriptions. Anyone with a
sense of history in the Middle East will know this cannot be taken
in a positive light by the region if they have any concern for their
own security. Combined with Saddam's past aggressive indiscretions
against his neighbours, and continued rhetoric about a united Arab
world, we may be excused for thinking we have a classic megalomaniac
on our hands. (He also refused to meet with Richard Butler or Rolf
Ekeus of UNSCOM at any point, as he considered it beneath his dignity
- how medieval!) The short of it is that Saddam's goals do not stop
at the borders of Iraq.
Whilst no evidence has
been found to link Iraq to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
Saddam knows he is in the spotlight of the US. The continued sabre-rattling
of Washington, combined with Saddam's knowledge of his own guilt
on the aforementioned points, has led to somewhat of a back flip
on his part. Twelve years to the day after the invasion of Kuwait,
Saddam has expressed his willingness to have UN weapons inspectors
return to Iraq. Predictably, the US has rejected these overtures
as a joke.
Only two things remain
to explain Saddam's change of heart. The first reason is that he
obviously sees the US efforts in lobbying for support are beginning
to have effect. Even Jordan seems to have taken a lighter view of
a new attack on Iraq (they were neutral in 1991). Despite King Abdullah's
public anti-war rhetoric, he has allowed a small amount of US forces
into Jordan to make preparations for the pending invasion. Saddam
knows that most countries in the world cannot afford to support
Iraq at the expense of offending the US. Secondly, he also knows
the propensity of US presidents for launching attacks during periods
of popularity slump. Bush is certainly in no trouble in that arena
at the moment, but the support for his administration will wane
and is already showing signs of such. Saddam would be aware of this
and know that he has limited time to react.
The upshot of all of
this is that the US may feel it is necessary to attack Iraq sooner
rather than later. Iraq has an increasingly supported position in
the Middle East that is beginning to infringe on the ability of
the West to exert their influence over this strategically important
region. Bush will continue to lobby for support in an attack on
Iraq. If he is able to get this and it coincides with declining
domestic approval, then the likelihood is that we will see the situation
come to a head with the removal of Saddam. The strategic reasons
are becoming apparent and the efforts of Washington are currently
focused on modifying the individual situations that would inhibit
the ability of a US attack. War in Iraq is imminent.
Author: Rob Wood
Contact: news@polosbastards.com
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